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Introduction 
The work of developing a Sociology of human rights to challenge the 
dominance of the legal framework within which they are more usually studied 
is now well underway (eg Morris 2006; Turner 2006; Woodiwiss 2005, 2006).  
Once we move beyond legal positivism, however, we immediately find 
ourselves in the rather murky and difficult terrain of moral judgement 
concerning human rights.  What reflexive normative stance should 
Sociologists take towards human rights?  Should we give up the rather 
dubious Weberian neutrality that may enable us, sometimes, to pass as 
‘scientific’ and adopt a positive perspective on human rights, promoting their 
extension across the globe and championing their full adoption within our 
own states?  What, then, of Sociology’s traditionally critical perspective?  
Sociology is a critical discipline, which embraced modernity whilst at the same 
time treating it with suspicion because of the inequalities of wealth, status and 
power to which it has given rise.  In one way, in an increasingly globally 
integrated, post-socialist world, it might be argued that human rights 
currently offer moral values, political tools, and increasingly legal institutions 
that both enable hope and are reasonably realistic, so that furthering human 
rights through sociological argument and study is itself a critical practice.  To 
some extent I agree with this point of view, especially because criticism 
without positive alternatives is often intellectually facile and politically futile.  
Here, however I want to present an alternative argument, that it is important 
that Sociology should develop a critical perspective on actually existing human 
rights, as well as working for their extension.  Not just for reasons of freedom 
of thought and intellectual development, but also because: firstly, human 
rights do not encapsulate everything humans can, or should, hope for, and 
they may actually be in tension with other values; and secondly, as the 
language of human rights becomes increasingly popular, it is clear that they 
are being used for a variety of purposes, in many different ways and with 
many different outcomes.  Of course, it can be argued that some uses are 
against the spirit and even the letter of human rights as laid out in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but the fact that human rights are 
being used in this variety of ways should surely raise doubts about treating 
them in absolutist moral terms.  Sociology should remain critical of 
established practices and apparently taken-for-granted values, even if they 
appear to offer the only realistic political hope of our times. 
 
Let’s begin with Richard Rorty’s notion of ‘human rights culture’ (Rorty 1993). 
Rorty uses this term to argue against foundationalism, suggesting that human 
rights are well-established institutionally and that the only real problem now 
in realising the values of human rights is that some people continue to treat 
others as less than human.  Rorty’s concept of ‘human rights culture’ is left 
undefined, no doubt in part strategically, to enable it to act as a kind of 
rallying symbol for progressives, both liberal and left.  However, there is no 
doubt that he is correct in arguing that there has been a huge increase in the 
use of human rights language in law and politics, especially since the end of 
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the Cold War.  Human rights are increasingly becoming legalised: 
international agreements are becoming more detailed, precise and binding; 
and law that draws on and invokes human rights is increasingly interpreted 
and applied in national and international courts (see Abbot and Keohane 
2001).  At the same time, human rights are also increasingly politicised. The 
influence of NGOs in extending human rights to bring about legal and political 
change at the international and national levels can not be over-estimated 
(Risse et al. 1999; Keck and Sikkink 1998).  And human rights rhetoric is also 
used by mainstream politicians, especially to promote particular foreign 
policies.  In recent times, notoriously, this has tended to take the form of 
humanitarian intervention, or what Ulrich Beck has called ‘military 
humanism’ (Beck 2006).  The pernicious consequences of such uses of human 
rights have been widely discussed (see, for example, Butler 2004; Ignatieff 
2001).   
 
In this chapter I want briefly to explore how a critical Sociology of human 
rights might approach the question of how and why the proliferation of 
human rights discourse has not led, in general, to the more ethical treatment 
of human beings across the world.  On the contrary, the ‘war on terror’ has 
made it very clear that states which have been central to supporting the 
expansion and deepening of human rights, and that apparently have a 
continuing commitment to the realisation of human rights norms, are 
themselves among the violators of human rights.  Critical Sociologists should 
therefore consider the possibility that there are links between this 
proliferation of discourses on human rights and human rights violations.   
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Of course, this article can not hope to outline a comprehensive critical 
Sociology of human rights.  It is rather intended to suggest some ways in 
which current research might be used and extended to study human rights.  In 
the following section, we will explore the links between the exponential 
increase in human rights discourse and violations of human rights in social 
structures of inequality and exclusion.  We will then go on, in the second 
section of this paper, to discuss the tension between human rights and 
democracy as political values.  Finally, changing direction somewhat in 
section three, we consider a contribution Sociology should make to 
understanding how human rights are supported or undermined by structures 
of embodied interaction, an area of research into human rights that has been 
neglected.  I have chosen these three areas -social structures, political 
institutions, and social interaction - as representative of core concerns of 
Sociology in order to explore how a critical Sociology of human rights might 
develop.   
 
Social structures of citizenship and human rights 
Key to developing a critical Sociology of human rights is the study of the 
relationship between citizenship and human rights.  In principle, human 
rights abolish the distinction between citizens and non-citizens.  Article 2 of 
the UDHR states that ‘Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set 
forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind…’ and goes on to list 
‘race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status’ as non-viable distinctions.  It is 
no longer quite the case that, as Arendt wrote of stateless persons between the 
two World Wars, 
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 ‘The conception of human rights, based upon the assumed existence of a 
human being as such, broke down at the very moment when those who 
professed to believe in it were for the first time confronted with people who 
had indeed lost all other qualities and specific relationships – except they were 
still human’ (Arendt 1968: 299; see also Agamben 1996).   
 
In fact, since the late 20th century, legal claims to human rights in developed 
liberal-democracies have been complicating the distinction between citizen 
and ‘mere human’ rather than abolishing or maintaining it, creating different 
grades of citizenship, ‘quasi-citizenship’ and even ‘un-citizenship’ status.     
 
David Lockwood’s work on civic stratification is a very useful starting point for 
critical Sociology here (see Morris 2006).  Lockwood argues that the actual 
enjoyment of rights depends on two interlinked axes of inequality: the 
presence or absence of legal, bureaucratic rights; and the possession of moral 
or material resources, which generally operate informally. As we shall see, the 
interplay of these two axes means that claims for human rights that are 
intended to ‘humanise’ the regulation of migration across borders actually 
produce new types of formally and substantively unequal status.  At the same 
time, the substantive erosion of citizenship entitlements as a result of neo-
liberal globalisation is not addressed by human rights claims.   
 
An analysis of different types of status produced with respect to citizenship 
and human rights would have to include at least the following five 
distinctions.  Firstly, within the legal status of ‘full citizenship’ there is a 
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marked difference between what we might call ‘super-citizens’ and ‘marginal 
citizens’ in relation to human rights.  ‘Super-citizens’ have all the rights of 
citizens but increasingly, in a de-regulated global political economy, because 
they own the means of production or are in possession of secure employment 
or marketable skills which enable mobility across borders, their citizenship 
does not tie them to states.  Overlapping with Craig Calhoun’s (2003) category 
of ‘frequent flier’ elite cosmopolitans, this group stand to gain from human 
rights only insofar as human rights policies succeed in making the world 
generally more stable and profitable.  Their protected mobility, however, 
comes from their citizenship status as well as from their wealth and/or skills.  
When faced with unstable or dangerous political conditions, ‘super-citizens’ 
are more likely to fly home or appeal to the authorities of the states to which 
they belong to intervene on their behalf than they are to claim human rights.  
These individuals may be involved in the extension of human rights as 
professionals – especially as lawyers or the leaders of INGOs – but they would 
not generally expect to see themselves as the subjects of human rights claims.   
 
‘Super-citizens’ can be compared with a second status group, ‘marginal 
citizens’, who have full citizenship rights but who either do not have paid 
work, or who have insecure or partial participation in the labour market.  This 
group enjoys full citizenship rights, which, as civil rights, protect them from 
state force in a reasonably functioning multi-party democracy, but 
increasingly the social and economic benefits of citizenship to which they have 
been entitled are under attack as the regulation of capitalism is altered in 
conditions of increased global mobility (see Turner 2001).  It is only because 
understandings of human rights are truncated that deteriorating marginal 
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citizenship appears to have nothing to do with human rights.  In the West, the 
term ‘human rights’ is used almost exclusively to mean the civil rights covered 
by the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).  However, 
human rights also include social and economic rights - spelled out in detail in 
the UDHR and the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR).  Claims to economic and social human rights have been 
somewhat effective in gaining entitlements for migrants within existing, 
deteriorating state regimes of welfare, but human rights language has not 
been developed to address issues of welfare more generally (cf Marshall 1992).  
Despite the importance of economic and social human rights on paper, they 
do not provide protection for marginal citizens and appear, rather, to have 
nothing to do with the welfare of citizens. 
 
Thirdly, outside these unequally positioned citizens, there are quasi-citizens.  
Quasi-citizens are denizens, or long-term residents in a state who have access 
to employment and who have thereby gained social and even economic rights 
within states, but who do not have political rights.  This is a diverse group, 
including EU citizens, guest-workers, and those who have been granted 
refugee status or ‘exceptional leave to remain’ (1).  Whilst as Yasemine Soysal 
(1994) has argued, what she calls ‘postnational citizenship’ has been an 
important advance for migrants in terms of institutionalising their human 
rights, it is becoming increasingly clear that the instability of their legal status 
as ‘not-citizens’ and their reliance on organising around human rights as a 
means to apply pressure on national law and national bureaucracy also results 
in a consequent instability of their human rights as such.  An excellent 
example of the dangers of quasi-citizenship for human rights in this respect 
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comes from the UK.  As a result of the ‘war on terror’, a number of men who 
were granted asylum because of well-founded fears of persecution in other 
states and who were subsequently suspected of terrorist activities in the UK 
were arrested and detained without charge in Belmarsh Prison from 
December 2001 to March 2005.  They were then detained, still without being 
charged, under house arrest, where they remain at the time of writing.  In the 
name of protecting human rights – so not deporting these men to states where 
they have citizenship but are at risk of torture - the UK authorities are 
violating their absolutely fundamental human rights to individual freedom, 
bodily integrity and fair trial.   
 
The precariousness of the position of quasi-citizens is even greater for sub-
citizens who do not have paid employment, or entitlement to state benefits.  
This category includes those who are waiting to have asylum cases heard, and 
who may be detained indefinitely in camps whilst that process is going on.  It 
also includes those considered to be adult dependants of quasi-citizens – 
wives and other family members - who have no independent right to residence 
and who are, therefore, potentially subject to violence and abuse within the 
home (without real possibility of redress), as well from their home states.  This 
category of ‘sub-citizens’ is literally created by human rights, administered 
through state-specific policies.  Again, contrary to the ideals of human rights 
as inviolable, universal and protective of all human beings, human rights here 
create a group of persons whose rights are fragile, insecure and may actually 
result in violations of their dignity, freedom and bodily integrity. 
 
 8
Finally, even sub-citizens are in a good position compared with un-citizens.  
This group includes illegal migrants who have no recognised status in 
receiving countries and who may, therefore, be immediately deported, unless 
they are permitted to apply for asylum.  It also now includes people detained 
in the ‘war on terror’ in newly created non-spaces which are outside national 
territories and therefore somehow also outside the jurisdiction of sovereign 
states, whilst being under their administration.  The most obvious example 
here is Guantanamo Bay, though there are also other such camps containing 
‘suspected terrorists’ in Bhagram, Kandahar and elsewhere.  These un-citizens 
are in a legal ‘black hole’ because of the special status they have been assigned 
as ‘illegal combatants’ and the extraordinary lengths to which the US executive 
has gone to deny them access to lawyers and to keep them out of US courts 
(Steyn 2004).  Interestingly, with regard to Arendt’s suspicions concerning 
human rights, it is citizenship status, combined with diplomatic relations 
between allies, and not claims for human rights, which has enabled relief for 
some of the detainees in Guantanamo Bay, by political intervention rather 
than legal redress.  All those holding British passports have been sent back to 
Britain and released without charge, for example, but until very recently the 
UK authorities refused to apply for the release of non-citizens resident in the 
UK.  Under legal pressure from the detainees’ families and possibly as a result 
of changes in US policy with regard to Guantanamo, there is currently ongoing 
negotiation between the US and UK over whether and how to deal with these 
non-British un-citizens, all of whom have been imprisoned without trial for 
several years.   
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The increasing legalisation of human rights has led neither to ready 
guarantees of human rights commitments, nor an end to human rights 
violations.  It has led to a great deal of legal creativity.  Of course, in many 
ways it is clear that legalisation is crucial to realising human rights.  To return 
to the example of the arbitrary detention of terrorist suspects in the UK, it was 
only because the UK’s highest court found that the policy was in contravention 
of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) that the UK 
government was forced to release the prisoners from Belmarsh, and the policy 
of house arrest that replaced it has similarly been found to be illegal under the 
ECHR.  However, one of the major drawbacks of the legalisation of human 
rights is the way in which those who appear to have uncertain legal status, or 
even no legal status in extreme cases, whether in terms of citizenship or 
human rights, are treated as virtually non-human.  As Sociologists we are 
well-equipped to study how the legalisation of human rights is at best partial 
and at worst obfuscating of inequalities in the moral, political and material 
resources that have such a huge impact on the outcomes of the codification of 
human rights claims in practice.   
 
Aside from the paradox of gross violations of fundamental human rights being 
perpetuated in the name of human rights that is practically enabled by their 
legalisation, there is a very important limitation to political uses of human 
rights in relation to social structures and inequalities.  Although on paper the 
UDHR and the ICESCR allow for claims to social and economic rights, in 
practice the erosion of citizenship entitlements to welfare, housing, education 
and so on has not been addressed through human rights claims.  Moreover, 
the proliferation of legal statuses in relation to human rights and citizenship, 
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whilst it has led to gains for some people, surely makes co-ordinated collective 
political action increasingly difficult.  In this sense it is difficult to see how the 
language of human rights might function politically, as the language of 
citizenship rights did in the twentieth century, to harness state power to 
humanise capitalism.  
 
Political institutions and democracy  
In this section we will explore how human rights, even, or perhaps especially, 
if they work efficiently as legal rights, are in tension with another very 
important political value, that of democracy.  There is no straightforward 
conflict between the values of human rights and of democracy.  On the 
contrary, in some respects they complement each other.  Democracy is 
generally understood to support human rights, and this may even include 
economic and social rights; famously, Amartya Sen has discovered that there 
has never been a famine in a democratic country (Sen 1999).  Furthermore, 
respect for human rights, as civil and political rights, provide the necessary 
conditions for political activities of all kinds, including democratic 
participation – freedom of speech, of association, secret ballots free of 
corruption and so on (see Dworkin 1990).  On this basis, in conditions of 
increasing globalisation in which the boundaries of political community are no 
longer clear-cut, theorists of cosmopolitan democracy argue that the 
institutionalisation of human rights as global public law is necessary to ensure 
individual rights to autonomy which will enable democracy at different scales, 
according to the ‘all affected’ rule (Held 1995).  On the other hand, however, it 
is clear that the more the outcome of democratic deliberation is circumscribed 
legally, and therefore depends on the decisions of unelected and 
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unrepresentative judges, the less scope there is for genuine public decision-
making, whether local, national or international (see Bellamy 1999 for an 
extended argument concerning the limitations of rights in relation to 
democracy).   
 
That this is a real tension is illustrated by the example of the celebrated 
Pinochet case.  Arrested in October 1998 with a warrant from a Spanish 
magistrate, Pinochet was under house arrest in the UK until he was finally 
declared by the Foreign Secretary to be medically unfit for trial and flown 
home to Chile in March 2000.  The circuitous legal case resulted in a ground-
breaking decision by senior judges in the UK that he should be extradited for 
trial in Spain for crimes of genocide, torture and disappearances committed 
whilst he was head of Chile (2).  International lawyers, international human 
rights NGOs like Amnesty and Human Rights Watch, and sociologists of 
cosmopolitanism agree that Pinochet was a landmark – the first time a head 
of state came close to being tried for gross violations of human rights 
committed during peace-time in a domestic court (Sands 2005; Habermas 
1999; Beck 2006).  In relation to democracy, however, the Pinochet case is 
much less obviously an occasion for celebration, and should provoke critical 
thought concerning the extension of international law.  The judges who ruled 
that Pinochet should be extradited for trial in Spain decided to ignore the 
amnesty he had been granted by a democratically elected government in Chile, 
so ‘piercing’ the sovereignty of the national state on which modern democracy 
has been founded (the term is Slaughter’s 2005).  No alternative democratic 
forum to decide where Pinochet should be tried or if he should have been sent 
back to Chile was considered in relation to the case.  Options that might have 
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been more democratic - for example, a citizens’ jury or a conference of elected 
parliamentarians from the relevant states - were not discussed.  On the 
contrary, the Pinochet case was generally represented as involving law, not 
politics, even though ultimately it involved a ‘quasi-judicial’ decision by the 
executive represented by the Foreign Secretary (see Nash forthcoming).  
Although Pinochet was not extradited to Spain for trial, the view that there is 
now an international consensus that crimes against humanity should be 
prosecuted regardless of sovereignty appeared to be confirmed, whilst no 
alternative forms of democratic control over powerful states was sought, or 
even imagined (3).  
 
This example shows how the legalisation of human rights is in tension with 
democracy, even when the values of the rights themselves to democracy are 
not in question.  However, as well as showing the dangers of legalisation for 
democracy, the Pinochet case also shows very well the limitation of the politics 
of human rights.  It is widely agreed that it was diplomatic negotiations 
behind the scenes which led to his release, ostensibly on grounds of ill-health, 
and which mean that he was never tried for the crimes of which he was 
accused (Davis 2000).  Politics is by definition unpredictable and even unfair, 
its outcomes are related to perceived interests, shows of strength, the ability to 
back persuasion with force, willingness to compromise and so on.  Politics 
involves negotiating conflict without necessarily abolishing inequalities in 
power, as the law claims to be able to do, even if democratic politics gestures 
towards the equality of individual voices.  Moreover, the legal importance of 
the Pinochet case was that it allowed for the trumping of sovereignty, so 
moving towards protection or redress for individuals regardless of citizenship 
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status or residence.  It thus promised to disrupt existing international 
relations between states which are embedded in the UN system, premised on 
the juridical fiction of equality between sovereign states, in order to realise 
Article 2 of the UDHR in practice, enabling individuals access to justice for 
human rights violations regardless of citizenship or nationality.  It is 
inconceivable that real politick would have anything like the same effect.   
 
Like the UDHR, democracy is an achievement. Tension between human rights 
and democracy as incompatible political values is not absolute, but it is 
significant and enduring.   Critical Sociologists who advocate human rights 
should also consider how practices of democracy in a globalising world can be 
supported rather than undermined, even where the risk comes from what 
appears on the face of it to be a valid and groundbreaking assertion of human 
rights principles. 
 
Embodied interaction
In many respects, this is the most important level at which critical Sociologists 
should consider how commitments to human rights are formed and sustained, 
or denied and fail.  After all, whilst human rights concern the obligations of 
states, it is human beings in extraordinarily intimate relationships with each 
other who carry out torture, murder, imprisonment without trial and so on.  If 
vulnerability is, or should be the foundation of human rights (Turner 1993), it 
is in embodied interactions that the vulnerability of human beings is directly 
experienced, which then gives rise either to exploitation or to sympathy and 
kindness. However, embodied interaction it is also the least researched area in 
the Sociology of human rights.  In particular we need more research on the 
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relationship of human rights language to emotions – of fear, hatred and 
disgust - felt in relation to those who are experienced as less-than-human and 
who do not therefore have to be treated as entitled to dignity and respect.  It is 
absolutely crucial to explore what makes it both possible, and feel ‘right’ to 
those who imprison, torture and kill in the name of the state or of political 
ideology, to carry out human rights abuses.   
 
For example, we know that following the Nuremberg trials soldiers and guards 
no longer have legal grounds for the excuse ‘I was just following orders’ (see 
Held 1995: 101), but I do not know of any research which considers state 
agents who have refused to follow orders in the name of human rights.  On the 
other hand, there is widespread evidence (from Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo 
Bay to name only the most obvious cases) of the apparent willingness of 
soldiers and guards to violate human rights once they find themselves in 
situations in which they have the power and the desire to do so, no doubt 
sanctioned by their hierarchical superiors in the state in whose name they are 
employed.  This willingness to abuse human beings does not appear to have 
been reduced with the expansion of legal and political discourses of human 
rights.  An interesting example of the de-humanisation of relations between 
prisoners and guards comes from the film directed by Michael Winterbottom, 
‘Road to Guantanamo’: illustrated by dramatised scenes, one of the ex-
detainees recalls a technique used by the guards to avoid meeting prisoners’ 
eyes, shouting at them to look down and gesturing with two fingers as if 
closing their eyes at a distance if they sought eye contact.  This is clearly a 
technique designed to enable the ‘legal black hole’ of Guantanamo to run 
smoothly.  We now know that this smooth running involved torture.  How can 
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the abstract language of human rights possibly have any impact on the 
experience of individuals when it is so methodically structured in order to de-
humanise those who are most vulnerable to abuse?  The legal and political 
structures designed to prevent and to punish violations of human rights seem 
very far from such interactions. 
 
What might critical Sociologists have to contribute to our understanding of 
the impact that human rights could and should have on those who actually 
carry out human rights abuses?  In the first place, we might contribute the 
hope that human beings are not, as Freud had it, ‘fatefully evil’ (see Benton 
2006 page 36) so that the infliction of suffering can be prevented and not 
merely punished.  More concretely, however, anthropologists have begun the 
work of considering how human rights can become part of the vernacular of 
local cultures, translated from the terms in which they are framed by activists 
and lawyers in accordance with international conventions and treaties (see 
Merry 2006).  Similarly, sociologists might examine how the language of 
human rights is or is not translated into the subcultures of those most at risk 
of carrying out human rights abuses, and try to understand how effective such 
human rights talk might be in the highly charged emotional settings in which 
abuse takes place.   
 
Conclusion 
One way to consider the role of the critical Sociologist in relation to human 
rights might be to ask ‘who is empowered in current regimes of human rights’?  
It is not obvious that vulnerable individuals and groups are empowered by the 
ongoing legalisation and politicisation of human rights – at least not in any 
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straightforward, unequivocal way. On the contrary, the only actors who are 
clearly and unequivocally empowered appear to be professionals in the human 
rights business, including lawyers, judges, politicians and the leaders of 
INGOs.  As we have seen, in relation to the proliferation of statuses with 
respect to the relationship of citizenship and human rights, those who are the 
subjects of human rights either remain or are placed in precarious, unstable 
and dangerous situations – sometimes in the very name of protecting their 
human rights.  It would seem then that, at worst, the proliferation of legal and 
political discourses of human rights may be producing new forms of 
vulnerability to domination, exclusion and mistreatment.  This is not to say 
that overall human rights are increasing suffering.  The fate of quasi- and un-
citizens may be worse without them, for example.  But critical Sociologists are 
obliged to examine examples of such paradoxical outcomes of human rights 
claims, not to dismiss human rights as useless but in order to understand how 
bad outcomes are produced by good intentions and to suggest how human 
rights might better be realised.   Finally, critical Sociologists must be aware of 
the limitations of human rights, the way in which, in practice, they may 
problematise or undermine other, equally important, political values.  Whilst 
genuine respect for human rights may be necessary to civilised behaviour, 
human rights are clearly not enough to meet all the needs of human societies. 
 
 
Notes
1. This typology is quite rough and ready and EU citizens are hard to place 
within it.  Many EU citizens might be thought of as ‘super-citizens’, whilst 
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those from less economically and politically powerful states surely belong in 
the category of ‘quasi-citizens’.    
 
2. In strictly legal terms, the Pinochet case did not involve human rights 
violations.  Human rights law takes the form of civil and public law and offers 
only civil remedies – though the increasingly overlap between humanitarian 
law, which does allow criminal prosecution, and human rights law, is now 
complicating a clear-cut distinction between them.  For the purposes of 
sociological study, however, what is at issue is a wider sociological category of 
‘human rights’, which includes legal definitions but enables us to understand 
social, cultural and political changes.  It is in this sociological sense that the 
Pinochet case involved human rights: both Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch frequently described it in general terms as concerning human 
rights violations; in the media the case was invariably represented as 
concerning human rights; and even lawyers and judges are prone to analysing 
the case as part of the wider ‘human rights movement’ (eg see Steyn 2004).    
 
3. Note that in relation to trying crimes under international humanitarian law 
the problem is not solved by the setting up of the ICC.  Apart from the fact that 
it has not been ratified by all states a) it is only authorised to bring cases 
where the will or the means are judged to be lacking in national societies; b) as 
a matter of statute it will not recognise amnesties where crimes against 
humanity may have been committed.  
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